"The Intersection of Caste and Gender: An Essential Framework for Understanding Social Experience"

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This paper will discuss how feminist ideas have a duty to answer issues regarding caste experiences. After establishing the caste-gender system as a conceptual category, the article proceeds to trace its hints in the lives of dalit women1. One side of the coin contains the ambitions of the prevailing feminist currents to represent "Indian" women, which has often stifled the dalit woman's voice and made her less visible. On the other hand, her experiences have been taken for granted by those who are trying to "retrieve" marginalised voices. Reifying her identity has been the task of recovery, which involves normalising both the historical and discursive aspects. In discussing subaltern living forms, the article interacts with a diverse range of feminists and other thinkers. Its goal is to convey the ambiguity and complexity with which feminists' genuine concerns must be expressed. While considering the potential of "self-reflection," it aims to promote feminist activities in a responsible manner.

The gendered caste system and its effects on lived reality

There is a discriminatory system that uses caste and gender. My usage of the phrase "caste-gender system" is based on Gayle Rubin's (1975) "sex-gender system" 3. In Indian social structures, the institution of caste functions in systematic collaboration with discriminatory gender norms, similar to the sex-gender system. There are direct and indirect ways to think about the connection between gender and caste. Similarly to other forms of stratification, caste indirectly affects gender. To be more explicit, the caste system's core process is sexist. The 'full' control of women's bodies and souls is the foundation upon which the caste system rests.By resolving the issue of "surplus woman" through the framework of endogamy, B.R. Ambedkar's writings justify the patriarchal basis of caste system, which includes sati, enforced widowhood, girl marriage, the ban of pratiloma marriage, and various other discriminatory practices. In his book "Caste in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development," B. R. Ambedkar makes the strongest case for the connections between gender and caste. He explains how the Brahmins had cunningly created caste by manipulating their wives, saying, "...superimposition of endogamy on exogamy means the creation of caste." Ambedkar notes that the en-dogamy requirement is the preservation of a fixed sex ratio within a caste. An essential problem emerges from an excess of males and females in this model.

The plight of women has been disproportionately affected by several unjust decrees.Given this, you can't handle an excess guy the same way you would an excess woman...(248–259) in 2002.

To address the issue of "surplus woman," three distinct uxorial practices were established: sati, enforced widowhood, and girl marriage. The excess guy may remarry and take a new wife as sati and enforced widowhood did not apply to him. The guy might bring his wife from lower mar-riageable ranks in order to limit the likelihood of her being used to boost competitiveness. An 'inexorable' law of caste endogamy, operating through an ensemble of institutional agreements imposing unequal norms and practices on men and women, is at the heart of the caste-gender system, which can be described as a "graded hierarchical structure of purity-pollution" that is associated with a person's birth (Rubin 1975, 204).

This study is not concerned with outlining the basic ideas of the caste-gender system4, which is an essential but unfinished task of feminist theory. This study continues to stay on the theoretical side of things, but it does make reference to an issue that is a reasonable next step, which is to define the caste-gender system. It discusses the modern political and geographical landscape of India and the need to confront the caste-gender system in order to develop a nuanced philosophy of feminism. 'Indian' feminism has become narrow and fragile due to its hegemonic inclinations, which were clearly seen in the dalit feminist movements of the 1990s. As a result of current feminist tendencies, the experiences and struggles of dalit women are either changed or ignored. This is an inspiring time of introspection for feminists who are looking to tackle this problem. My usual approach to this dilemma is to see it through the lens of the struggles that feminism has waged against the caste-gender system via the use of the analytical category of experience. The strength of my argument would be somewhat diminished by the conceptual jump I admit I made, from the fundamental structure of the caste-gender system to its modern struggles with feminism.

I will admit that this deficiency in our understanding of caste is indicative of a larger epistemic violation in how we interpret it. The first is that nationalist and Marxist historians have both tended to gloss over caste. However, there has been a disturbing schism between the "theoretical brahmans" and the "empirical shudras" within the social sciences as a result of their increasing involvement in caste study over the last half-century (Guru 2002).Scholarly work on caste in institutions consistently treats the non-dominant caste and/or ordinary people's perspectives as non-knowledgeable and unauthentic. A structural descriptive way of depicting caste is sometimes used in social science and historical discourses.

There are arguments that see caste as an undeniable symbol of India's backwardness that is impeding the country's progress towards nationhood and modernity.Our privileged status as ruling castes, together with these factors, has severely warped our perceptions of society. Scholars have determined that acknowledging caste as a legacy of oppression that manifests in contemporary inequalities is an essential but insufficient criterion for changing the conversation. The phenomenological aspects of caste must be considered alongside the structural encounters with it. Some researchers have stressed the need of moving towards a caste phenomenology that takes into account the lived realities of the non-dominant.

There are still not many well-reasoned theories on the experiences of Indian castes. Genuine

representation has been the subject of debates over its feasibility, ethics, and politics, with a particular emphasis on the untouchability and Dalit experiences. Some scholars, like Guru (1995, 2012) and Rege (1998), are challenging the dominance of "Western" ideas by proposing "alternative" ways of understanding "Indian" experiences. Conversely, certain schools of feminist thought (Scott 1988, 91) have long struggled with the challenge of establishing the veracity of discursively constructed identities like "woman" via the use of personal experience.

The mistake is not in depending on it, but in taking what one knows from one's experiences for granted. The result is an essentialization of identities and a reification of the subject. Thinking about a complex feminist stance in India's geopolitical arena has made me aware of many of these uncertainties. The idea of a dialogue between the perspectives of feminist arguments and dalit experiences intrigues me.

Permit me to pause for a moment and reflect on the meaning of the term "experience" as it pertains to feminism's past before continuing with my argument. Originating from the Latin root ex-perientia, meaning "knowledge gained by repeated trials," the English term "experience" has its roots in this concept. The Latin word "experiri," meaning "to try" or "to test," is its root. If paleonymic traces persist in language, then experience has the procedural character of a series of trials. It is defined by the coexistence of potential and impossibility, and it is always unfinished. As everything is continually in motion, there is no way to fully understand an experience, but there is always the chance that it will be an observation, acquaintance, or incident that impacts someone. The feminist movement's history is similarly marked by this imprint of the processual. The idea of a unified political movement was born out of the "politics of experience," which laid the groundwork for "second-wave feminism" by highlighting the commonalities among women's lived experiences. However, it was quickly pointed out that women's subjective experiences had always varied by class, colour, nationality, and religion. Feminist theory and practice faced fresh obstacles, and the prospect of a unified movement was dashed. As it draws from a variety of feminist theories that deal with the issue of inter-subjective experience, this study is nonetheless politically motivated by the topic of the dalit woman's experience.

An encounter with a dalit lady

The mainstream dalit school of thought pays little attention to gender problems, and there are universalizing tendencies in so-called "Indian" feminist theory. This is something that the dalit feminists are fighting against. These subtleties, according to mainstream feminist views put forth by dalit feminists, provide a "multicultural" perspective. However, Western arguments and taxonomies often take front stage in such methods. Despite the great cultural diversity in the South of the world, there is a certain amount of consensus on the definition of feminism in Western discourses. The disparities among women get muddled as a result of a merging of diverse experiences, maps, and histories. There is a theoretical model that combines the experiences of many women despite their very varied backgrounds and circumstances. Similar to how Indian women do not constitute an automatic or unified group, Indian feminism is never a homogeneous concept.

Each of these communities is riven by the history of strife and the alliances and divides brought about by various forms of discrimination, such as sexual orientation, religion, class, and caste. Because of this diversity within the "Indian" woman category, feminism in India is a political impossibility. While maintaining a feminist political stance, it is necessary to deconstruct the concept of the "Indian" woman.

That just won't happen. Because it is impossible to conceive of politics without putting diversity on ice.

- In politics, generalisations are necessary. So, what about that specific dalit woman?
- At the very least, three distinct ways of thinking are conceivable
- A dalit lady is no different from an aristocratic woman from a higher caste.
- An inherent flaw in this way of thinking is that it promotes homogeneity at the expense of the uniqueness of the dalit lady.
- There is a loss of context about their background, experience, and politics.

A dalit woman is everything that an upper-caste or elite woman is not: she is a victim, an object of study, someone who is 'ignorant,' impoverished, uneduc-cated, tradition-bound, domestic,' and so on. She exemplifies the polar opposite of the upper caste/elite: she is "enlightened," "affluent," "educated," "modern," "public-oriented," and the "emancipated subject."

One of the problems with this kind of thinking is that it reduces dalit women to the status of an objectified "other" to the upper-caste, aristocratic women. ii) If dalit women are defined by their struggles (or their successes), we erase them from history and confine them to a certain moment and place.

There is a distinction between dalit women and non-dalit women. She defies the dominating power's laws since she is so alienated and unlike them. She is validated by her experience, which goes beyond the common feminist idea.

The objectification and exotisiza-tion of dalit women, which prevents a generalised politics based on experience, are two of the main problems with this way of thought.

Positional relationship to the "dominant woman" provides the "dalit woman" with its (provisional) description. In addition to being portrayed as the polar opposite of the upper-caste lady, she is often compared to or even seen as a compliment to her. The dalit woman is seen as a variant of the non-dalit elite woman in all three of these scenarios: the sameness of accommodation and unification, the inferiority of exclusion and denial, and the difference of objectification and exotisization. Every one of these three ways of looking at dalit women simplifies them by reducing them to a homogeneous group, devoid of the diversity that makes up the non-dalit woman. All three of these ways of looking at the dalit lady focus on her unique "presence" in relation to her historical and geographical context.

A "presence" that transcends the complexities and dead ends of current feminist discourses in India and the so-called "high-feminist theory of the West.". It seems as if the dalit woman's existence, sorrows, and resistances come before re-presentation; all that matters is the living she does, the agony she suffers, and the voice she raises. As if discourses and subjects are not interdependent, and as though discourses do not mediate experience. The presence of the dalit lady is validated and valorized by the unmediated experience. Her objectivity is left untied and assumed.

"Dalit Women Talk Differently": The 1995 article by Gopal Guru and the subsequent debates provided a starting point for resolving the issue of reclaiming the dalit woman's perspective. The aristocratic voices that represented modern Indian feminism were openly opposed to this. To stand up for the "differently talking" dalit women and against the dominating middle-class women and patriarchal dalit men, Guru offered a dalit perspective approach. The potential for dalit perspectives to rethink dominant feminisms is something that Sharmila Rege agrees with Guru's stance on. Despite this, she sidesteps Gu-ru's concern that the dalit women's organisations' and their epistemological standpoints' potential for emancipation by ignoring her emphasis on the validity of their voices (1998:44). In spite of Rege's acknowledgment of the multitude of voices. The concept of "difference," in her view, confines feminist politics to the level of the person. There can be no "community of resistance" when politicians prioritise individualism. Resistance to feminist politics occurs at the community level due to internal and external disparities, as well as "inter" and "intra" differentiated identities at the individual level. Although it originates from dalit women's experiences, Rege argues that the dalit feminist perspective becomes politically useful via its interventions with other groups. By sharing their aspirations and actions with other feminist groups, they may change their subjugated circumstances. This in no way gives the dominant group the right to vouch for them. Instead, it would encourage people to change their opinions and "reinvent themselves as dalit feminists" (45). According to Rege, dalit feminism's liberatory activity has two sides: on the one hand, it involves a politics of difference, and on the other, it assumes the primacy of their experience. This opens doors for the mainstream strands of feminism. Rege states categorically that "... to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience on claims of authenticity may lead to a narrow identity politics (44)" and so rejects the dalit woman's first-hand account. However, in her perspective theory, the defining and authenticating moment of the standpoints is the complete presence of experience, which she must maintain.

Sandra Harding usually works on this issue after becoming aware of it. Sandra Harding writes in her 1991 article "Subjectivity, Experience and Knowledge: An Epistemology from/for Rainbow Coalition Politics" that feminist knowledge will be "incoherent" due to the fact that women, for example, live in oppositional racial, class, and sexuality relations (175-6). She does admit that there are some problems with recognising the importance of variety of experience and with stressing the co-constitutivity of experiences and viewpoints. Firstly, it might cause a kind of solipsism or the seemingly irrational belief that one can only describe their own personal experiences. Another issue that arises from the first is that people often talk about their experiences without really analysing them. "The speaker also chooses not to examine the ways in which the speaker's own group—

women—are shaped by racism, imperialism, class exploitation, and forced heterosexuality" (178–179). Although they do so from an epistemological stance, point-of-view theorists often seek to resolve issues stemming from the multiplicity of experiences and from using the word "experience" without any intermediaries. Their perspective is that this is a political experience rather than just a being experience. The idea of presence is firmly linked to the sense of being. This seems to be called into question by the inherent immanence or dynamic nature of the concept of politics, such as battle. However, complete immersion in political experience is implicitly required for politics or struggle to serve as the foundation of a stance.

'Frustration' and 'anger' are moral issues that Guru (2012) brings up when he states that one cannot speak for the dalit. A significant undercurrent in Guru's piece is the resentment, which is sometimes reasonable, against non-dalits who attempt to explain dalit experience via theory. It is wicked, in his view, to theorise subaltern experiences without really experiencing the humiliation and anguish firsthand, and this indignation is shared by many, if not all, groups that strongly resent being studied by those who do not belong to them (Sarukkai 2007:4043). In order to consider the validity of this viewpoint, Sundar Sarukkai (2012) introduces the conceptual dichotomy in his inspiring conversation with Guru between the two types of experience: ownership, which arises from being in a circumstance that is not our choice, and authorship, which arises from situations that we actively seek out. In his observation, Sarukkai notes, "lived experience is not about freedom of experience—it is about the lack of freedom in an experience" (2007: 4045). Put in this context, Guru's argument makes the experience holder the only one with the right to tell the story of their own experiences. The owner of experience is not, in the truest meaning of the word, the "owner" of experience, as Sarukkai correctly points out.

That person has ownership of one's experiences, but lacks the ability to create or own the many components that make up those experiences. The oppressed Dalit person has every right to claim ownership of their persecution. Nevertheless, oppression always includes an oppressor—whether it be a person or a system—over which the dalit has no say or ownership (Sarukkai 2007: 4046)8. That being said, it's possible that the experience category won't be sufficient to validate one's claim about the conceptual interpretation of their experience. The issues with the external theories are immediately pointed out by Sarukkai. Denying the ontological connections between experience and reason, theoretical work devoid of first-hand experience is a rejection of both. To "distribute the guilt"—that is, to stay outside the experiences of oppression and suffering—among the "generalised others"9, is what Sarukkai means when she rationalises the field of theory by removing the streaks of experience in a Habermasian stride. For those of us without first-hand experience, theory is not a place to air our grievances. "Theory encompasses the experience of suffering and pain, the integration of reason and emotion, and the linking of the epistemological with the emotional" (438).

The discussion takes an intriguing turn thanks to Sarukkai's perspective on the topic, which concerns the power of theory. There is more to it than just asking if true knowledge might come from within or outside. Even more importantly, the discussion eventually turns to the morality of theory itself.

Experience also proves to be a pivotal arbitration point in theoretical ethics. However, we can't use our experiences to back up our theories or explain anything. There can be no transformation until both experiences and the identities they give rise to are rendered obsolete. We must not forget that whomever does theorizing—the daliton herself or someone else's—must challenge the very idea of experience. In her 1991 piece "The Evidence of Experi-ence," Scott notes that historians who are attempting to reclaim the voices of the oppressed often take experience for granted. As a result, identities like "woman," "Black," and "transgender" are often normalised or reified. Such distinctive pasts "take as self-evident the identities of those whose experiences are being documented and thus naturalise their difference" (1991: 777). This is not to say that one should reject experience as a way to learn, however. The real issue isn't with experiencing anything; it's with seeing first-hand knowledge as unmediated, which causes subjects to be reified and identities to be essentialized.

An Issue with Past Knowledge

Although the creation of experience as a category has not been theorised, it serves as a basic category in canonical historical literature. It would seem that a pre-discursive reality is based on experience. While these methods of exposing "reality" may show how dominance is now structured, they "precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself" (1991: 778). Contrary to what one would expect, Scott argues that lived experience is not an absolute reality that must be acknowledged before any cultural representation can take place.

That which we call "experience" is really a "discursively organised in particular contexts or configurations" (1998: 5). She imagines speech as an evolving system that generates meaning by distinction. Only by staying within the boundaries of the established semiotic framework can experience be considered. The acknowledged sign system is what makes an experience possible. We may call such experience a "linguistic event" thereafter. Its connection to language is indisputable. This connection, however, does not provide a "fixed order of meaning" for experience or resolve conflicts between competing discourses. The space for several interpretations is really expanded. Scott was certain that words could not replace experience. She prefers to pursue a conditional, contextual, and contentious discursive interpretation of experience.

According to Scott, it is through experience that persons are formed as subjects. This is intricately linked to the anti-essentialism aim, rather than just a trick that disproves a causal paradigm. "Contingent Foundations," an essay by Judith Butler, is perhaps the project's most powerful statement.

"The subject is not placed in a cultural context after it has already been produced; rather, the cultural context is already there as the disarticulated process of that subject's production, hidden by the frame that would place a ready-made subject in an external web of cultural relations" (1995:46). Refusing agency is never an option when one adopts a constructivist view of the subject. Keep in mind that a subject's condition and the statuses placed upon them give rise to agency. He or she is presented with options that are meaningful in several domains, such as social, political, economic,

ethical, and others. The self is reified and subjectivity effaces when experience rejects the discursive mediations through which it is conceived. Experience now serves to both derive and define the self. The uniqueness of the individual as a subject, capable of making choices by navigating both structural and experiential constraints, is thereby erased.

The assumption that one's experiences are factual may be problematic in light of the reciprocity between discourse-language and experience. It is quite problematic, however, to view experience as a language event in and of itself. If any extra-linguistic materiality is denied, linguistic reductionism might be the logical outcome. Theoretically, Butler would place an emphasis on the linguistic source of materiality rather than reject it outright. Only inside the phrase would the stuff be apparent as "material," she would explain. The importance of the extra-linguistic (social), the unconscious (psychoanalytic), and the ontic (phenomenological) would be undermined by a linguistic essentialism that disregards the co-constitutivity of the linguistic with other aspects. Ideology, power, authority, and other concepts are intricately interwoven throughout this mediation process. Language, a vast system of signifying, mediates between all these categories.

Discourses and histories mediate between experience and reality. And we learn about discourses and histories via our own experiences. But it doesn't establish that experience is the bedrock of knowledge. I refuse to accept that this shift towards experience is an essentialist one. A idea, like experience, does not need a starting point unless it is presumed to have an existence unaffected by discourses and histories. Within broader language systems, discourse, history, and experience function as intricate frameworks of over-determination that are ideologically connected. Language is also not provided here. Language is partial, dependent, and conditional since it is formed. Views of experience based on the full presence principle disregard the mediating roles played by language in prior knowledge. Our memory of such mediations is jogged by Scott. But she herself fails to "get over" (or maybe forgets) the transient nature of words.

Here, a thinker such as Sarukkai may make the case that Western theoretical frameworks based on the dichotomy between knower and known are exclusive to the mediated concept of experience. Beyond the knower-known dichotomy, Eastern knowledge forms are phenomenological in nature. He distinguishes between two types of experiences: conceptual (about which one has already made a value judgement) and instantaneous (which is unmediated by ideas; experience subject). This knower-known barrier is one that perspective feminist theorists want to bridge. A knower is not treated favourably by them. "The standpoint of women never leaves the actual," in contrast to scientific discourses that start with the schema or notions of that discourse and then go towards the actual to discover them. There is a certain configuration of the day/night world in which the knowing subject is situated at all times. The goal of her investigation is to "discover and explain what she does not know, namely, the invisible social relations and organisation that permeate her world" (Smith 1992:91).

Additional approaches to the issue of experience do exist. A respectful emotional connection of identification with the experience of someone 'radically' different from oneself is explored by

feminists like Sonia Kruks, who critically critique Scott's perspective. Even across countries, the common experience of being a woman is insufficient to warrant claims of sisterhood. Still, women from all walks of life join together to beg us not to give up on the "token" of common ground. Despite its inherent fragility, the commonality of experience remains an important factor in feminist politics. "While shared experiences of being a woman do not provide a foundation for a "sisterhood," I do think they can provide what I will refer to as an emotional tendency to stand up for women who are different from oneself—a tendency towards feminist solidarity" (Kruks 2001:151)11. When it comes to "others," Kruk's "affective predisposition" brings up "our" physical anxieties, mental turmoil, and pain. By reimagining female embodiment as a "world-travelling" praxis and replacing "sisterhood" with "affects as a phenomeno-logical mode of engagement against the discourse oriented post-modern orientations," she helps bring feminists together through "respectful recognition" and encourages the development of "sympathetic bodies" among individuals who have a moral obligation to learn about others.

Developing such sentiments may depend on the matized (155). According to Kruks, "sentience" rather than "conscious thinking" or "discursive de-liberations" induces the instant perception of the "other's" suffering. This, in her view, does not need appropriating the other by taking on "her" pain or claiming to have completely experienced "her" story.

Recognising the validity of this viewpoint, I would want to bring up a few of issues. To start, it's not just about how much of an identifier with the "other" you are; the issue here goes beyond that. Instead, it's about making choices and speaking on behalf of the other person. According to Alcoff (1991: 29), "...the practice of speaking for oth-ers is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another's situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise." Does the elite feminist, driven by her "sentience," also tend to make decisions on behalf of the "dalit woman" when she feels the pain of that woman? How will these choices affect the 'other' woman's' life? Although her intention is to help her dalit "sisters" improve their lives, her words might have unintended consequences that reinforce casteism and make her less heard. Second, there's an issue with asking about "affective predisposition" "beyond" discursive mediations. "Affective predisposition" seems to include both a procedural component and a degree of spontaneity. A feminist outburst, however, cannot be removed from discourses due to the immediate character of the reaction. Discourse does not always elicit well-considered replies. Typical assumptions, commonsense views, and unconscious biases towards the "other" are all parts of elite speech. Is it possible to imagine a pure flash of emotion, outside from the realm of conversation, even when "affective predisposition" functions as praxis or an evolving moral obligation? Assumptions about identities, "otherness," and "selfhood" that exist inside, under, or on top of the existing discourses enshroud the subject's experience within various ideologies. If these mediations are disregarded, the "affective predisposition" of the individuals going through the experience will unwittingly overshadow and perpetuate the discriminatory practices they are attempting to combat.

Thirdly, according to Kruks, a subject who is experiencing something is not only a receiver of reality as it is constructed via discourse. Theoretically absent from Scott's postmodern theory of subjectivity, she evokes an actively knowing sentient "body-subject" in the vein of Marleau Ponty. Feminist praxis, in her view, develops from the emotional domain of lived experience rather than from language or intellect. Kruks uses a compelling example to illustrate her thesis.

... if I happen to be strolling down the street and see a youngster losing their balance I will swiftly go forward to console her as I see, physically move, and empathise with her anguish and fear on the sidewalk in front of me (148). Regardless of her internal experiences, I fail to see any rationale that extends beyond the realm of discourses when she observes the distressed infant and rushes to her aid. The choice to assist the "other" (here a youngster) in a coordinated mind-body manner is an admirable and commendable deed. How could anybody possibly overlook this? How does it go beyond the unconscious assumptions about the child's race, gender, and socioeconomic status that may initiate the response (a violent outburst)? At the section's conclusion, she makes an impressive statement on the "inter constituency of the physical, cognitive and cultural/discursive is at play in... experience - and the lived-body is its site" (149). She claims to be "going beyond discourses," but why? Does Scott's and similar postmodern theories only aim to criticise the discourse and language that are overly emphasised? For Kruks to figure things out, why does he have to discredit discursive mediations of experience?

Debjani Ganguly (2005) critically addresses the discursive's relevance while thinking about dalit experiences of atrocities. Reading caste as speech is an unfounded assumption in her work. on ignoring the realities faced by so-called "South Asian people." Rather, she emphasises the need of understanding how different forms of caste discourse are shared in society as "common sense" and "popular belief" and how they relate to the suffering of victims of caste violence (Ganguly 2005:10). Rather of seeing caste through the Western lenses of "atypical," "pre-modern," or "insidi-ous," she views it as a performative category intertwined with daily life. As a result of people's "non-conceptual and non-ideological" (24) daily encounters with caste, the rational discursive labels created by western knowledge systems are undermined. Despite this, the postcolonial political, activist, and scholarly currents have relied on rational-western discursive formulations time and time again, leaving out any performative traces. Beyond this, she often catches a glimpse of a type of existence that, via the performative concept of caste, survives colonial control and global capitalist modernity. Let us follow her reasoning for a little, even if the ideas of non-ideological caste experiences and their persistence seem dubious.

The first, according to Ganguly, is the logical western discourse, which includes sociology and philosophy, and the second, the emotive performative discourse, which includes mythology and literature, are two distinct types of speech. Despite her efforts to decenter western academic knowledge in its understanding, she allegedly clings to the discursivity of caste. Affective histories and "counter-modern" mythologies that outline "...singularities that exceed the circumscription of the sociological and philosophical categories" are Ganguly's primary areas of research (25). She gets a

glimpse of an urban way of life, "particularly the dalit's own," by using dalit creative works that delve into the "vicissitudes and pleasures of daily living on the slums and streets of Mumbai" (27).

It is on the basis of "the ethics of dalit everyday different from the macro ethics of nation building and modernization" (27), that she seeks to theorise the specific (dalit) people. Once again, the peculiarities of the subaltern are being sought for in relation to the supposed uniqueness of their subjective experience, free from the imprints of the dominant contemporary! Evidently, at the heart of dalit experience is the intolerable misery of daily life, which undermines the liberatory promises of modernity. Still, it's impossible to ignore the ways in which certain contemporary technologies influence "dalit experience"—naming, documenting, challenging, flouting, and altering it. How could anyone fail to see the experiential angsthas' response to modernity? How have these discussions affected "their" and "our" day-to-day lives? Why is it so difficult to see how the "rational western" and the "affective performative" are mutually constitutive?

V. Geetha raised several issues with Aditya Nigam's (2000) comment on the dalit criticism of modernity's epistemology in a brief response essay he published back in 2001. Like Ganguly, Nigam argues that dalit politics stands firmly in contrast to the current political binary of nationalism/colonialism and secularism/communalism. Politics among Dalits "...represents in its very existence, the problematic 'third term' that continuously challenges the common sense of the secular-modern" (2456). As Nigam considers the potential of the dalit intellectuals' knowledge, he notices that the criticism of modernity is "absent" from most of their publications. Oppression, he says, is synonymous with dalit epistemology's absence."[I]t is neither causal nor mimetic that the relationship between dalit epistemology and experience is," Geetha argues. Rather, it is mediated: oppression and liberation theories and ideologies, as well as felt concepts of injustice and sorrow, come together to form new knowledge. To account for On a different note, dalit epistemology presents challenges when it appeals to an unmediated concept of experience. A peculiar reflection of the indefinable "inner voice" that Gandhi spoke of—a voice whose assertions of truth are obvious—is what it generates. Also, using one's own experiences in place of reasoning and analysis might cause one to stray from the original scope of their criticism. (163).

Here, she refers to the situation in which feminists actively participate in the lived world. She continues by explaining how certain feminist schools of thought cast doubt on the veracity of women's lived experiences by highlighting the inadequateness of experience as a theoretical and practical basis. Intersectional connections (of language, class, caste, religion, ethnicity, and experience) and discursive mediations, according to Geetha, necessitate contextualising the experience category.

Reflection in politics

Histories and discourses, particularly the more powerful ones, shape the dalit woman's experience just as they do everyone else's. By choosing to ignore these mediations, the stories told by those who have experienced them unwittingly ensnare and hide the unequal behaviours that give rise to them. I

don't want to belittle the experiences of dalit women by limiting them to abstract ideas. No matter what is said or written about her, her incredible presence—her names, faces, and histories—will always be alive, thanks to the strength of her bearing and resistance to suffering. How effective is this theory, therefore? A deconstructive gesture is being used to try to criticise the "full presence" of experience. The idea is to consider the fact that knowledge is created via experience at the same time as it is not confined to it. Beyond first-hand experience, there are hints of generalizable facts in the body of knowledge. How exactly experience and generalizability are interdependent is a theoretical topic that I will not abandon. On the contrary, for the time being, I will put aside the issue of the generalizability of experience across hierarchies. I use the particular/dalit woman's experience question to advance an alternative political agenda.

Reiterating my earlier remark, I agree with Rege that non-Dalit feminists might rebrand themselves as DAFs (1998:45). Even so, I am not interpreting it in her way. Instead, I'd give it back to the powerful feminists. A critical examination of the "self" is what I'm after, namely how non-dalit feminism shapes dalit women. Think about how the powerful lady set herself up to be her enemy. From what I've gathered, the non-dalit women's experiences have shaped the dalit woman into a "other" from the non-dalit woman. How the 'other' woman feels the joy and sorrow, the load and exhilaration, of the non-dalit woman's daily life and how it affects her. A "responsible" action must be considered in light of the fact that this other in gone is inevitable. One possible way to look at this is via the lens of the "eating well" concept proposed by Derrida (1991).14.Eating healthily is a metonymic way of meeting the other. He is acting ethically by preserving the otherness of others. While "Eating well" strives to move beyond cannibalism, its remnants keep popping up. Even if this cannibalism is inevitable, Derrida usually acts morally towards the other who is eaten.

To fully grasp one's own make-up, it is necessary to do regular self-evaluations. One might consider the ways in which women engage in blatantly sexist behaviour, both towards other women and against themselves. This is not the place for the dominating woman to air her grievances via self-reflection. The shortcomings of this confessional style in theoretical work are correctly pointed out by Guru (2012).

Such inferences are untenable on behalf of the liberal majority's compassion. The liberal perspective views the treatment of Dalit women as a systemic problem that needs fixing so that it may stop happening and give these women the respect they deserve. Reducing violent incidents is critical, but there's also the pressing need to examine one's own "self," or how one's own actions contribute to the cycle of violence. It is still necessary to consider in terms of abstract categories in order to escape the labyrinth of misology. Engaging in self-criticism is like taking part in a conversation: you reflect on your own and other people's identities via theoretical-fictional, narrative-conversational lenses.

Allow me to elaborate on my argument in response to a possible criticism of self-reflection and its outcomes. As an ethical and political strategy, I argue that the dominant should reflect on their own experiences in relation to the constructions of otherness by the dalit. Under the guise of introspection, I imagine and may even affirm a united and totalizing influence of the prevailing life

spheres. The supposedly conceptual boundary of dalit presence and identity is non-dalit lived worlds. The elite-subaltern relationship dispute is becoming closer as a result of this.15 I would highlight two points in answer to the question, bearing in mind the intricacies of the subaltern-elite dynamic. Recognising that the dalit category is based on the non-dalit's lived and discursive practices does not imply that her identity as an inherent member of the dominant has to be sacrificed. A pure area of marginal experience is not even produced by this. My argument is not that one must choose between two extremes in order to participate in feminist politics—the dominant and the non-dominant. Instead, I find that it's easier to discern how contrasting expressions are mutually constitutive.

The op-positional structures that separate them may be ripped apart if this happened. Maybe this would provide some diversity to the experience event. For the non-dominant whose experiences had never achieved the purported authenticity, being conscious of this diversity as a political act is empowering. Even while we are the 'owners,' Sarukkai made an intriguing point when she said that we are not the 'writers' of our own experiences. Neither the oppressor nor the "bigger categories" that evaluate the dalit's tale are under her control. In this case, what would a feminist do responsibly? Would it be as simple as recalling the dalit life-worlds, which would be only a small part of a much bigger narrative? It would still be necessary to dismember the dominant's life practices, wouldn't it? Why?

In contrast to the mainstream and Brahmanical feminist movements that have obscured the unique experiences of Dalit women, this article suggests alternative feminist political frameworks.While debating the "genuineness" of first-hand accounts, it is important to consider ethical feminist stances that span India's geopolitical landscape. For me, contemplating a complex branch of feminism involves taking stock of one's own dominant-class identity. Though I don't discount the event's unity or the predictable construction (by discourse, power, history, etc.), I do prefer to ponder the indecision that accompanies experience and its diversity. The calculable realm of experience is what I strive to incorporate with inevitability, unknowability, and chance. Enshrined in the violent conflicts, it suggests that the dalit woman's interactions with non-dalits are diverse. From this point on, I suppose, one may carry on a discussion.

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“The Intersection of Caste and Gender: An Essential Framework for Understanding Social Experience”

Dr. Rishi Kumar Sharma

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